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I. INTRODUCTION 
CafePress Inc. (“CafePress”) respectfully seeks reconsideration of the Court’s 
ruling on its Summary Judgment Motion (Dkt. No. 48) on the grounds that the Court’s 
conclusion that CafePress was not, as a matter of law, entitled to safe harbor protection 
under 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) was clear legal error because it (1) turned on unrelated, 
indisputably non-infringing aspects of CafePress’ services as opposed to whether the 
images at issue in this lawsuit were stored at the direction of a user, which is the focus of 
the statute and its protections, and (2) denied summary judgment based on certain of 
Plaintiff’s arguments, not evidence, which are insufficient to defeat summary judgment 
as a matter of law. 
First, the Court’s conclusion that CafePress cannot as a matter of law be deemed a 
“service provider” because it determines the retail prices and pays users a royalty for 
products sold through the Marketplace (Order at  8) is premised on a distinction that is 
immaterial under the statute, which distinguishes between material stored at the direction 
of a user and allegedly infringing content made available by the website itself.  DMCA 
eligibility does not turn on sales, pricing, or other activities performed by an Internet 
service provider because there is nothing inherently infringing (or noninfringing) about 
setting prices on a website.  There is simply no basis in the text of the DMCA or 
controlling Ninth Circuit precedent to support this view.  In fact, the DMCA broadly 
defines “service provider” under § 512(k)(1)(B) to encompass a wide range of providers, 
and the Ninth Circuit has made clear that the fact that a website may do more than simply 
host or store materials does not disqualify it from safe harbor protection under § 512(c).  
See UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners LLC, 718 F.3d 1006, 1019-20 (9th 
Cir. 2013) (“[I]f Congress wanted to confine § 512(c) exclusively to web hosts rather 
than reach a wider range of service providers . . . [w]e presume that Congress [] would 
have taken the more straightforward course of clarifying in the definition of ‘service 
provider’ that, as it applies to § 512(c), only web hosts qualify”; holding that Veoh was a 
service provider even though it created smaller file copies, transcoded user videos on its 
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own, prominently displayed those videos on the homepage of its website, made it 
possible for unrelated users to stream or watch those videos, and allowed unrelated users 
to download and further access those videos offline).  
Second, for the same reasons, it was error for the Court to conclude that the back-
end services provided by CafePress that “go beyond facilitating the storage and access 
of” the allegedly infringing images negate summary judgment because the allegedly 
infringing activities occurred “by reason of the storage at the direction of a user” and are 
therefore protected under § 512(c).  See Order at 11.  Indeed, the back end services 
provided by CafePress arguably were much less significant than those provided by Veoh 
in Shelter Capital Partners, where Veoh allowed users to download identical digital 
copies which could easily be copied millions of times and distributed or sold to thousands 
of third parties.  The reason these features were not deemed material in Shelter Partners 
is because the relevant inquiry for evaluating if a website is eligible for the user storage 
safe harbor turns on whether the material was stored at the direction of a user, not on 
whether the website facilitated sales or other access to such material, and therefore the 
Ninth Circuit applies a “but for” test in analyzing such issues.  See Shelter Capital 
Partners, 718 F.3d at 1018-20 (rejecting arguments to read § 512(c) narrowly and 
explaining that the statute is to be construed broadly to protect more than simply web 
hosting services, and analogizing that the “by reason of” language requires only “but for” 
rather than proximate causation).  Here, because it is undisputed that the uploading of 
images onto CafePress’ website was initiated entirely by users, the sale of allegedly 
infringing items on the Marketplace could not have taken place “but for” the images and 
designs uploaded by users and denial of summary judgment on this basis was improper.  
Third, the Court further erred in denying summary judgment on the issues of 
“direct financial benefit” and “right and ability to control” under § 512(c)(1)(B) because 
the statute and case law make it clear that plaintiff must satisfy both prongs in order to 
overcome the safe harbor.  See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(B) (safe harbor applies if a service 
provider “does not receive a financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing 
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activity, in a case in which the service provider has the right and ability to control such 
activity”); Ellison v. Robertson, 189 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1062 & 1078 (C.D. Cal. 2002) 
(“Even if AOL had the right and ability to control Robertson's infringing activity, it 
would not be liable for vicarious copyright infringement because it did not derive a direct 
financial benefit from that activity”;  “Ellison must show that AOL derived a direct 
financial benefit from the infringement and had the right and ability to supervise the 
infringing activity”), aff'd in part, rev'd in part and remanded on other grounds, 357 F.3d 
1072 (9th Cir. 2004); Arista Records LLC v. Myxer Inc., No. 08-cv-03935 GAF JCX, 
2011 WL 11660773, at *29 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 2011); Io Grp., Inc. v. Veoh Networks, 
Inc., 586 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1150 (N.D. Cal. 2008); Capitol Records, LLC v. Vimeo, LLC, 
No. 09-cv-10101, __F. Supp. 2d__, 2013 WL 5272932, at *22 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 18, 2013) 
(“[T]he Court concludes that Vimeo lacked the right and ability to control infringing 
activity . . . The Court thus need not decide whether it received a financial benefit.”); 
Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1110 (W.D. Wash. 2004).  
Again, the plaintiff bears the burden of proof to overcome the DMCA safe harbor once a 
defendant makes a prima facie showing of entitlement to the safe harbor.  Given that the 
Court found that Plaintiff offered no evidence that the alleged infringement in this case 
constituted a draw for subscribers (Order at 13), Plaintiff failed to establish that 
CafePress received a financial benefit directly attributable to the alleged infringing 
activity and summary judgment should have been granted on the basis of Plaintiff’s 
failure to satisfy the first prong alone.  See Perfect 10 v. CCBill, 488 F.3d 1102, 1117-18 
(9th Cir. 2007) (holding that “the relevant inquiry is ‘whether the infringing activity 
constitutes a draw for subscribers, not just an added benefit’”); Viacom Int’l Inc. v. 
YouTube, Inc., 940 F. Supp. 2d 110 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (granting defendant’s motion for 
summary judgment where the plaintiff/content owner had the burden of proving that 
YouTube was not entitled to DMCA protection and lacked such proof); see also Celotext 
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986) (moving party’s burden on summary 
judgment is discharged by showing “an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving 
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party’s case”).  Yet even if CafePress were required to show that it lacked the “right and 
ability to control,” summary judgment should have been granted on the second prong as 
well because it is undisputed that CafePress deters infringement on its site.  Mere 
physical control over the material on its system is not enough because Plaintiff was 
required to show substantial influence or high levels of control over the actual infringing 
activity (i.e., the uploading of the allegedly infringing images).  See Shelter Capital 
Partners, 718 F.3d at 1030; CCBill, 488 F.3d at 1118; infra, § II(D).  Plaintiff failed to 
do so and the undisputed evidence is that CafePress had no involvement whatsoever in 
the uploading of user images.  Order at 2.   
Lastly, it was error to deny CafePress’ motion on the issue of “standard technical 
measures” because the Plaintiff failed to present any evidence to show that the use of 
metadata to identify or protect copyrighted works was a technical measure “developed 
pursuant to a broad consensus of copyright owners and service providers,” as required 
under § 512(i)(2). 
Accordingly, the Court should reconsider its ruling on these grounds because the 
factual issues identified by the Court are in fact not disputed for purposes of the Motion, 
which presents purely legal issues that support granting summary judgment in favor of 
CafePress. 
II. RECONSIDERATION OF CAFEPRESS’ SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT MOTION IS WARRANTED 
A. Legal Standard For Reconsideration 
A court has inherent authority to reconsider or modify its prior orders “to correct 
not only simple mistakes, but also decisions based on shifting precedent, rather than 
waiting for the time-consuming, costly process of appeal.”  U.S. v. Martin, 226 F.3d 
1042, 1049 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Lahiri v. Universal Music & Video Distrib. Corp., 
606 F.3d 1216, 1222 (9th Cir. 2010) (“In any case, a court may revisit prior decisions in a 
case and correct errors while the case is still pending.”); Amarel v. Connell, 102 F.3d 
1494, 1515 (9th Cir. 1996) (“acknowledging that ‘the interlocutory orders and rulings 
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made pre-trial by a district judge are subject to modification by the district judge at any 
time prior to final judgment,’” and “[t]here is ‘“there is no imperative duty to follow the 
earlier ruling”’”).  Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), a district court may 
revise an interlocutory order “at any time before entry of a judgment adjudicating all the 
claims.” Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 54(b).   
“A district court may properly reconsider its decision if it is (1) presented with 
newly discovered evidence (2) committed clear error or the initial decision was 
manifestly unjust, or (3) if there is an intervening change in controlling law.”  Smith v. 
Clark County School Dist., 727 F.3d 950, 955 (9th Cir. 2013) (“It is common for both 
trial and appellate courts to reconsider and change positions when they conclude that they 
made a mistake.  This is routine in judging, and there is nothing odd or improper about it.  
A trial court may reconsider and reach a conclusion contrary to an earlier decision, and a 
paradigmatic example of when this should be done is when the court made its prior 
decision without considering the legal standards in a controlling opinion . . . .”); see also 
Van Derheydt v. County of Placer, 32 Fed. Appx. 221, 222, 2002 WL 460215, at*1 (9th 
Cir. 2002) (Stating reconsideration is appropriate “(1) to correct manifest errors of law or 
fact upon which the judgment is based, (2) to present newly discovered or previously 
unavailable evidence, (3) to apply an intervening change in the law, and (4) to prevent 
manifest injustice”); Hadsell v. Cach, LLC, No. 12–cv–0235–L–RBB, 2014 WL 497433, 
at *2 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 2014) (granting defendant's motion for reconsideration and 
reversing denial of summary judgment). 
B. The Court Erred In Applying A Narrow Definition Of “Service Provider” 
That Is Unsupported By Statute Or Controlling Case Law 
Despite the Court’s acknowledgement that the DMCA broadly defines “service 
provider” for purposes of 17 U.S.C. § 512(c), the Court’s conclusion that CafePress 
could not be a deemed service provider as a matter of law is unsupported by the statute 
and by case law.   
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There is no legal authority for drawing a distinction between CafePress and other 
similar ecommerce sites like Amazon and eBay simply because CafePress allegedly 
determines retail prices for virtual products sold through the Marketplace (as opposed to 
individual user shops where the retail prices are set by the sellers, not CafePress), just as 
there is no statutory basis for excluding sites that license content or sell products from the 
definition of service provider applicable to the user storage safe harbor.  To the contrary, 
“courts have consistently found that websites that provide services over and above the 
mere storage of uploaded user content are service providers pursuant to § 512(k)(1)(B).”  
Capitol Records, LLC v. Vimeo, LLC, __F. Supp. 2d__, 2013 WL 5272932, at *7 
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 18, 2013) (holding that Vimeo, “a provider of online services that hosts 
and distributes user material by permitting its users to upload, share and view videos,” 
qualified as a service provider “[e]ven though Vimeo's activities are not limited to 
such”); see also Obodai v. Demand Media, Inc., Case No. 11 Civ. 2503 (PKC), 2012 WL 
2189740, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 12, 2012) (holding that a website that published its own 
content in addition to hosting and sharing users' content was a service provider), aff'd 
mem. on other grounds, 522 F. App'x 41 (2d Cir. 2013).  As made clear by the Ninth 
Circuit, “if Congress wanted to confine § 512(c) exclusively to web hosts rather than a 
wider range of service providers,” it could have done so by “clarifying in the definition of 
‘service provider’ that, as it applies to § 512(c), only web hosts qualify.”  Shelter Capital 
Partners, 718 F.3d at 1019.   
The mere fact that CafePress performs functions “beyond operating a service that 
merely facilitates the exchange of information between internet users” (see Order at 8) is 
immaterial because controlling Ninth Circuit precedent makes clear that the focus is on 
whether the allegedly infringing material was stored at the direction of a user.  See 
Shelter Capital Partners, 718 F.3d at 1019-20 (“[I]f Congress wanted to confine § 512(c) 
exclusively to web hosts rather than reach a wider range of service providers . . . [w]e 
presume that Congress [] would have taken the more straightforward course of clarifying 
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in the definition of ‘service provider’ that, as it applies to § 512(c), only web hosts 
qualify”). 
The opinion in Hendrickson v. Amazon.com, Inc., 298 F. Supp. 2d 914 (C.D. Cal. 
2003) does not support a narrower construction.  The point made in Hendrickson, that the 
plaintiff failed to show that Amazon “was not merely an internet service provider” but 
the “direct seller of the infringing item,” supported the finding that Amazon could not be 
held liable for direct infringement.  See id. at 915.  The issue was whether the allegedly 
infringing DVD in that case was stored at the direction of a user or made available by 
Amazon itself, not whether the service provider sells products.  See id.  There is no basis 
under the statute or other Ninth Circuit law to distinguish between service providers 
providing services for a fee (whether in the form of a subscription, listing fee, or other 
transaction charges) or services free of charge.  Compare Shelter Capital Partners, 718 
F.3d at 1011 (Veoh offered free services and generated revenues from advertising 
displayed along with the videos, and was held entitled to safe harbor protection) with 
Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. v. Fung, 710 F.3d 1020, 1045 (9th Cir. 2013) (finding 
no safe harbor where defendant generated revenue from advertising that depended on the 
number of visitors to his sites and encouraged infringing activity to attract visitors). 1  
Indeed, most websites are commercial and generate revenue through various means, and 
there is no basis to treat one type of service provider different because it derives revenue 
on the basis of, for example, sales, as opposed to ads.  See, e.g., Hendrickson v. eBay, 
                                           
1  In Columbia Pictures, the Ninth Circuit held that the operator of a Bit-Torrent tracker 
did not qualify as a service provider for purposes of the narrower definition applicable to 
the transitory digital network communications safe harbor under § 512(a) because 
trackers select the “points” to which a user's client will connect in order to download a 
file using the BitTorrent protocol and a service provider for the transitory digital network 
communications safe harbor must provide “connections . . . between or among points 
specified by a user.” 17 U.S.C.A. § 512(k)(1)(A).  See Columbia Pictures, 710 F.3d at 
1041.  However, the Ninth Circuit implied that Fung was a service provider under 
broader definition applied to § 512(c) in finding that Fung “facially eligible” for this safe 
harbor based on torrents collected for storage.  Id. at 1042-43. 
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Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1088 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (operator of a website for the purchase 
and sale of consumer goods); Corbis Corp., 351 F. Supp. 2d at 1100 (“Amazon operates 
websites, provides retail and third-party selling services to Internet users, and maintains 
computers to govern access to its websites.”). 
The alleged differences between the services provided by CafePress and those 
provided by Amazon and eBay are not relevant to the material issue of whether the 
images here were stored at the direction of a user.  Alleged differences were evaluated 
when comparing copies of content created by web hosting service providers to transmit 
to users and to copies made by Veoh in providing streaming and downloading services 
that the Court in Shelter Capital Partners found were not “meaningfully distinguishable” 
for § 512(c)(1) purposes.  See Shelter Capital Partners, 718 F.3d at 1018.  That 
CafePress may set the retail price for products sold on the Marketplace is no different 
from listing fees charged by eBay.  See Hendrickson v. eBay, Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 
1094 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (“eBay makes money through the collection of an ‘insertion fee’ 
for each listing and a ‘final value fee’ based on a percentage of the highest bid amount at 
the end of the auction”). 
Because it is undisputed that users uploaded the images at issue in this case (see 
Order at 3-5), and the DMCA applies a broad definition of “service provider” where the 
alleged infringement is based on material stored at the direction of a user, CafePress 
qualifies as a service provider within the meaning of § 512(k)(1)(B).   
C. The Court Misconstrued The User Storage Limitation And Did Not Apply 
The Ninth Circuit’s “But For” Test 
The Ninth Circuit has repeatedly stated that § 512(c) should not be read narrowly, 
and the Court’s application of the limitation, “by reason of the storage at the direction of 
a user,” is inconsistent with the Ninth Circuit’s holding that § 512(c) broadly covers 
“activities that go beyond storage” under a “but for” test.  Shelter Capital Partners, 718 
F.3d at 1017 n.7 and 1019-20; see also Columbia Pictures, 710 F.3d at 1042 (“As CCBill 
emphasized, we will not read requirements into the safe harbors that are not contained in 
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the text of the statute,” citing CCBill, 488 F.3d at 1116).  As explained by the Ninth 
Circuit, “but for” causation means “‘the event would not have occurred but for that 
conduct.’”  Shelter Capital Partners, 718 F.3d at 1017 n.6. 
Here, the Court found that CafePress’ Marketplace activities precluded summary 
judgment because CafePress allegedly (i) determines which images are sold through the 
Marketplace (because CafePress screens images for obvious infringement and 
compliance with its Content Usage Policy after they are uploaded by users, and because 
by default all user designs are sold through the Marketplace unless the user chooses to 
sell through individual shops; see Order at 2; Declaration of A. Lawrence, Exh. A at 
27:7-13), (ii) modifies designs on products sold through the Marketplace (which occurs 
automatically to adjust the dimensions of the image so that it will print on specific 
products but CafePress does not modify the content in the image; see Order at 2 & 3), 
(iii) sets the retail price for these products and pays a royalty or commission to the sellers 
(as opposed to the retail price set by users for items sold through individual shops where 
the only charges by CafePress are for blank products; see Lawrence Decl., Exh. B at 
45:15-20), and (iv) chooses which products are marketed through “feeds” to Amazon and 
eBay (but users have the choice of opting out of the Marketplace if they do not wish to 
have their products offered via these feeds; Order at 2-3; Declaration of Lindsay Moore 
(Dkt. No. 15-4), ¶ 7).  Order at 11.  However, none of these alleged activities (which 
CafePress assumes as true for purposes of this Motion) bar finding that the alleged 
infringement was “by reason of the storage at the direction of a user” because the user’s 
uploading and storage of the images without the direction or control of CafePress precede 
the occurrence of any activities on the Marketplace.    
Further, Shelter Capital Partners held that “[u]nder the broader definition [of 
service provider] appl[icable] to § 512(c), . . . there is no limitation on the service 
provider’s ability to modify user-submitted material to facilitate storage and access.”  
Shelter Capital Partners, 718 F.3d at 1019-20 (citing Io Grp., Inc. v. Veoh Networks, 
Inc., 586 F. Supp. 2d 1132 (N.D. Cal. 2008)).  None of these post-upload activities listed 
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above evidence any involvement by CafePress in the actual uploading of the user image, 
which was the focus of the Ninth Circuit’s findings.  Indeed, there is no evidence that 
CafePress “‘actively participate[s] in or supervise[s] file uploading’” or “‘preview[s] or 
select[s] the files before the upload is completed.’”  Shelter Capital Partners, 718 F. 3d 
at 1920.  Again, it is undisputed that the images are uploaded and stored at the direction 
of users, and that CafePress itself does not choose which images are uploaded because 
the process is automated and “no individual sees or approves images before or while they 
are uploaded.”  Order at 2.  Shelter Capital Partners therefore does not support the 
Court’s conclusion that CafePress’ “activities go beyond facilitating the storage and 
access of the allegedly infringing materials” (Order at 11). 
CafePress’ screening of images for compliance with its Content Usage Policy after 
they are uploaded automatically onto the website at the user’s direction, but before they 
are made available on the Marketplace also fails to take CafePress outside the safe harbor 
under Shelter Capital Partners.  Where Veoh similarly monitored videos for 
pornography and implemented filtering methods to disable infringing content, it was 
nonetheless entitled to the safe harbor.  See Shelter Capital Partners, 718 F.3d at 1012 
&n.2, 1031; see also CoStar Group, Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc., 164 F. Supp. 2d 688, 702 (D. 
Md. 2001) (holding that the defendant was entitled to the user storage limitation even 
though its employees manually reviewed photos submitted by users and posted to the 
website only those that met the defendant’s criteria (photos that depicted real estate and 
did not appear to be obviously copyrighted), aff’d on other grounds, 373 F.3d 544 (4th 
Cir. 2004).   
Similarly, the allegation that CafePress allows products to be “fed” to Amazon and 
eBay, also does not change the equation because the syndication feeds merely facilitate 
access to material stored at the direction of users.  See Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 
940 F. Supp. 2d 110, at *10-11 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (holding that YouTube’s practice of 
syndicating user content to third party mobile providers did not take YouTube outside the 
safe harbor). 
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Moreover, whether or not CafePress sets the retail price for products sold through 
the Marketplace is equally immaterial to a finding that CafePress is entitled to the safe 
harbor protections because the scope of § 512(c) is broad enough to reach sales, even if 
the activities are deemed infringing.  See Hendrickson v. eBay, Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 
1082, 1088 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (holding that the safe harbor applied to the sale and 
distribution of pirated copies of plaintiff’s work on eBay); see also Columbia Pictures, 
710 F.3d at 1042 (holding that §512(c), by virtue of the express terms of § 
512(c)(1)(A)(i), “explicitly covers not just the storage of infringing material, but also 
infringing “activit[ies]” that “us[e] the material [stored] on the system or network.” 
(brackets in original)).2   
“But for” the uploading of images by users, CafePress could not be held liable for 
products sold through the Marketplace.  Therefore, CafePress’ Marketplace activities do 
not create a material dispute that liability is premised on material uploaded and stored at 
the direction of a user. 
D. The Court Erred In Denying Summary Judgment On “Direct Financial 
Benefit”/“Right And Ability To Control” Based On The Undisputed Evidence 
The requirement that a service provider “not receive a financial benefit directly 
attributable to the infringing activity, in a case in which the service provider has the right 
and ability to control such activity,” 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(B), requires that the Plaintiff 
prove that CafePress (1) has a direct financial interest in the activity, and (2) has the right 
and ability to control it.  This is not an either/or test—both prongs need to be proven.  See 
                                           
2 Even though Columbia Pictures was an inducement case where the Ninth Circuit had 
little difficulty finding that defendant operators of various BitTorrent tracker sites were 
ineligible for safe harbor under § 512(c) (because Fung had “red flag” awareness of 
infringing files, the advertising revenue stream was tied directly tied to the number of 
visitors who were attracted primarily by the infringing activity on the websites, and had 
right and ability to control the activity where Fung personally assisted users in locating 
infringing files), the Appellate Court nonetheless found that defendants “would be at 
least facially eligible for the safe harbor” based on torrents uploaded by users of the 
websites.  Id. at 1042-46. 
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17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(B) (safe harbor applies if a service provider “does not receive a 
financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity, in a case in which the 
service provider has the right and ability to control such activity”); Ellison, 189 F. Supp. 
2d at 1062 & 1078 (“Even if AOL had the right and ability to control Robertson's 
infringing activity, it would not be liable for vicarious copyright infringement because it 
did not derive a direct financial benefit from that activity”;  “Ellison must show that AOL 
derived a direct financial benefit from the infringement and had the right and ability to 
supervise the infringing activity”), aff'd in part, rev'd in part and remanded on other 
grounds, 357 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 2004); Arista Records LLC, 2011 WL 11660773, at *29 
(“‘Both elements must be met for the safe harbor to be denied.’”); Io Grp., 586 F. Supp. 
2d at 1150 (same language); Capitol Records, 2013 WL 5272932, at *22 (“[T]he Court 
concludes that Vimeo lacked the right and ability to control infringing activity . . . The 
Court thus need not decide whether it received a financial benefit.”); Corbis Corp., 351 
F. Supp. 2d at 1110. 
The Court found that Plaintiff failed to meet this burden because “Plaintiff has 
offered no evidence that the instances of alleged infringement in this case constituted a 
draw for subscribers—i.e., attracted or retained subscriptions because of the infringement 
or lost subscriptions because of CafePress’s eventual obstruction of infringement” (which 
is what must be shown in the Ninth Circuit to establish direct financial benefit).  Order at 
13.  Accordingly, the Court erred in denying summary judgment where it was Plaintiff’s 
burden to prove both elements under subsection 512(c)(1)(B).  See CCBill, 488 F.3d at 
1118; Viacom, 940 F. Supp. 2d at 115 (granting defendant’s motion for summary 
judgment because a plaintiff/content owner has the burden of proving that a service 
provider is not entitled to DMCA protection on a summary judgment motion and proof 
was lacking in that case); see also Celotext Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986) 
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(moving party’s burden on summary judgment is discharged by showing “an absence of 
evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case”).3   
Further, it was error for the Court to conclude that CafePress’ alleged involvement 
in the “listing, sale, manufacture, and delivery of items” may constitute “right and ability 
to control” under the DMCA because in the Ninth Circuit, “right and ability” must 
involve “something more” that encourages infringement, and here “the undisputed 
evidence demonstrates that CafePress deterred infringement.”  Order at 13; see Shelter 
Capital Partners, 718 F.3d at 1030 (plaintiff must show that a defendant exerted 
“substantial influence” to induce infringement, or exercised “high levels of control over 
the activities of users” under the second prong).  CafePress’ post-upload activities are 
irrelevant to determining whether it had the ability to control the actual uploading of the 
allegedly infringing image.  See Io Grp., 586 F. Supp. 2d at 1151 (“the plain language of 
section 512(c) indicates that the pertinent inquiry is not whether Veoh has the right and 
ability to control its system, but rather, whether it has the right and ability to control the 
infringing activity” (emphasis in original)) and 1153 (concluding that “Veoh’s ability to 
control its index does not equate to an ability to identify and terminate infringing 
videos”).  Moreover, Plaintiff presented no evidence to show that CafePress in any way 
engages in the type of control that resembles Cybernet or “purposeful conduct” in 
Grokster.  See Shelter Capital Partners, 718 F.3d at 1030 (“‘Substantial influence’ may 
include . . . high levels of control over activities of users, as in [Perfect 10, Inc. v.] 
Cybernet [Ventures, Inc., 213 F. Supp. 2d 1146 (C.D. Cal. 2002)],” where the provider 
“instituted a monitoring program” and gave users “detailed instructions regard[ing] issues 
                                           
3 Moreover, the financial benefit must be directly attributable to the allegedly infringing 
activities at issue, and here, the undisputed evidence showed that CafePress deterred 
infringement.  See Order at 13; CCBill, 488 F.3d at 1118; see also Ellison v. Robertson, 
357 F.3d 1072, 1079 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that AOL did not have a financial interest 
in third-party acts of infringement where AOL charged customers a monthly flat fee for 
access and there was no evidence that AOL attracted or retained subscribers because of 
the alleged acts of infringement or lost subscriptions because of its eventual obstruction 
of the infringement). 
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of layout, appearance, and content,” “[o]r it may include purposeful conduct, as in [MGM 
Studios Inc. v.] Grokster[, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005)],” where the court found inducement 
of copyright infringement).  Indeed, given that CafePress has more than 12 million users 
and more than 600 million virtual products available on its website every day 
(Declaration of Lindsay Moore (Dkt. No. 15-4), ¶ 11), it is virtually impossible for 
CafePress to exercise the level of control required under § 512(c)(1)(B) over allegedly 
infringing activities.   See also Wolk v. Kodak Imaging Network, Inc., 840 F. Supp. 2d 
733, 748 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (ruling that right and ability to control “must take the form of 
prescreening content, rendering extensive advise to users regarding content and editing 
user content,” and “considering that millions of images are uploaded daily [to 
Photobucket], it is unlikely that this kind of prescreening is even feasible”). 
Based on the Court’s actual findings, Plaintiff did not meet his burden of proof and 
it was therefore error to deny summary judgment.  In any event, because CafePress does 
not encourage infringement on its site and actively deters infringement, CafePress meets 
the requirement under § 512(c)(1)(B). 
E. The Court Erred In Denying Summary Judgment On “Standard Technical 
Measures” Which Was Required Under Celotex 
While Plaintiff raised CafePress’ deletion of metadata in his opposition, Plaintiff 
offered no evidence that the use of metadata to identify or protect copyrighted works is a 
technical measure “developed pursuant to a broad consensus of copyright owners and 
service providers,” 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(2).  Although Plaintiff sued the alleged user and 
presumably obtained or could have obtained the original file that was uploaded by that 
user, there was no evidence that the alleged user in fact inputted any metadata that would 
be relevant.  Mere argument, without evidence, is not sufficient to overcome summary 
judgment, and no case has ever held that use of metadata to identify or protect 
copyrighted works was a standard technical measure.  Because the Court implicitly 
concluded that plaintiff did not establish that the use of metadata as a technical measure 
was developed pursuant to a “broad consensus” (see Order at 10), summary judgment 
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should have been granted under Celotex in the “absence of evidence to support the 
nonmoving party’s case.”  Celotext Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986).4   
Even if it were a standard technical measure, Plaintiff presented no evidence to 
suggest that metadata would in any way help a copyright owner locate or identify a 
copyrighted work (even though Plaintiff sued the user, Beverly Teall, and could have 
obtained from her the metadata associated with the images uploaded by Teall).  Plaintiff 
in any event was able to identify allegedly infringing user images and attached them to 
his complaint without any difficulty.  He offered no evidence or even an explanation of 
how metadata would have assisted copyright owners in ways not otherwise possible on 
CafePress’ website. 
Moreover, case law establishes that a service provider may modify the material 
submitted by users to facilitate storage and may provide editing tools to users.  See 
Shelter Capital, 718 F.3d at 1019-20 (“Under the broader definition applying to § 512(c), 
by contrast, there is no limitation on the service provider’s ability to modify user-
submitted material to facilitate storage and access[.]”); Wolk v. Kodak Imaging Network, 
Inc., 840 F. Supp. 2d 733, 744-45 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (holding that Photobucket’s providing 
users with editing tools does not interfere with standard technical measures).   
III. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should grant reconsideration and rule that 
CafePress is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. 
DATED:  March 26, 2014 Respectfully submitted, 
 GREENBERG TRAURIG, LLP 
By /s/Ian C. Ballon  
Ian C. Ballon 
Attorneys for Defendant, 
                                           
4 While it is Plaintiff’s burden of proof, CafePress could if necessary submit an expert 
declaration confirming that metadata has never been adopted as a standard technical 
measure. 
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CafePress Inc. 
Email:  ballon@gtlaw.com
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  Ian C. Ballon 
 Email:  Ballon@gtlaw.com 
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